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UNDERSTANDING THE LOGIC 
OF REBEL RESTRAINT ON 
LANDMINE USE1
By Henrique Garbino [ Uppsala University ]
N
on-state armed groups (NSAGs)2 have become the most 
frequent users of landmines and the main drivers of new 
landmine contamination. Often portrayed as the “perfect 
soldier” due to their low cost, easy availability, and high lethality, 
landmines have become the weapon of choice of many rebel groups. 
An initial assessment by Geneva Call reported that, in 2005, at least 
sixty rebel groups in twenty-four countries had used mines.3-5 In 
contrast with state governments, rebels have considerably less incen-
tives to comply with existing humanitarian norms.6 Engaging them 
in restricting or renouncing the use of landmines remains one of the 
most pressing practical obstacles toward a mine-free world. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of landmines and other 
explosive devices varies significantly in the level of restraint exercised 
by NSAGs. Some rebel groups indiscriminately lay mines irrespective 
of potential collateral damage,4 some directly target civilians,7 and 
others restrict themselves to command-detonated devices against gov-
ernment forces.8 Still, some NSAGs have committed to the total ban 
on landmines and others engage in mine action activities in one way 
or another.9 This wide difference in behavior raises the question: What 
explains variation in rebel restraint on landmine use?
Restraint on landmine use can be divided into two components. 
First, landmine use reflects the different categories in which landmines 
are employed, namely in strategy, type of device, trigger mechanism, 
location, frequency, and information-sharing. Second, restraint entails 
the deliberate behavior to restrict the use of violence. Civilians are vic-
timized by unrestrained violence either by direct one-sided violence or 
by collateral damage from the conflict. Therefore, landmine use should 
vary depending on a given NSAG’s restraint behavior.
Significant academic attention has been devoted to the causes and 
dynamics of violence against civilians. However, scholars have given 
much less emphasis on explaining the cases when violence does 
not happen, i.e., cases of restraint and compliance to humanitar-
ian norms.10 Throughout this article, restraint is defined as deliber-
ate actions limiting the use of violence,11 while compliance takes the 
meaning of adherence to humanitarian norms, more specifically to 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).6 Because IHL explicitly calls 
for restraint in the use of violence, it is often hard to distinguish the 
two concepts both in practice and in theory. Even though the literature 
on both concepts will be addressed in this section, it is worth noting 
that restraint can be exercised without compliance to humanitarian 
norms, such as when it is addressed only to specific groups.
This article aims to enhance the understanding of different incen-
tives and dynamics at play on rebel behavior. Insights on this field 
could inform government authorities, civil-society organizations, and 
advocacy groups when engaging with NSAGs.
RESTRAINT ON LANDMINE USE
Previous scholarship has addressed the logic of violence and restraint 
for different patterns of violence against civilians, such as indiscrimi-
nate violence, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and gender-based and 
sexual violence.12 Similarly, scholars have concentrated on explaining 
compliance to humanitarian norms, with a focus on child soldiering 
and the protection of prisoners of war, aid workers, and other catego-
ries of non-combatants. While some scholars have developed theo-
retical frameworks that could be generalized to other contexts, only 
a small number of authors have developed theoretical explanations of 
rebel restraint on landmine use.13,14 However, meaningfully contribut-
ing to the scarce literature on this topic, these authors adopt a rather 
narrow measure of restraint as commitment and compliance to a total 
ban on landmines.
Inherently indiscriminate weapons, anti-personnel landmines aim 
not to kill but maim the enemy, so that the wounded and agonizing sol-
dier would further consume the enemy’s resources and decrease their 
morale. Coupled with its secretive and unpredictable nature, land-
mines are highly effective in creating a permanent condition of uncer-
tainty and fear. Whether they are placed to directly target civilians or 
are left as remnants of war, landmines can cause significant harm to 
civilians and disrupt the social fabric of affected communities. In addi-
tion to the physical harm leading to death and permanent disabilities 
to survivors, psychological trauma, fear, and stress are widespread in 
mine-affected populations. Communities also suffer collectively by 
restricted access to livelihoods, key infrastructure, water sources, and 
are either forced to move or impeded to return to their homes.15
Given its nature, landmine use considerably differs from other 
forms of violence against civilians, such as indiscriminate or sexual 
violence. First, landmine use entails significant logistic and coordi-
nation capabilities. It follows that landmine use should reflect some 
strategic, rather than opportunistic, reasoning. Second, due to their 
static nature, landmines bring about geographically localized effects, 
meaning that landmines are more likely to affect specific groups 
depending on where they are placed. Third, most landmines remain 
active long after conflicts have ended, when virtually all mine victims 
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are non-combatants. Accounting for this longstanding and usually 
delayed effect on civilians requires long-term perspective and strategic 
thinking. Fourth, civilians may be either the direct target of mines or 
the collateral damage of the fighting; however, even in the latter case, 
armed groups should have accepted the risk of civilians falling victims 
of their mines.
Having said that, existing theories need to be adapted or reframed 
when examining landmine use; but it is first necessary to conceptual-
ize what restraint on landmine use is and how it can vary. 
Strategy. Factors such as the level of power asymmetry, the phase 
of the conflict, the extent of territorial control, the availability of land-
mines, and the knowledge in producing improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) may all influence the strategy behind the use of landmines. 
A Geneva Call report identified four main strategies guiding mine 
use, namely defensive, offensive, economic gain, and nuisance mining.4 
In defensive strategies, landmines aim to deter an enemy attack and 
restrict access to particular areas or routes of military value. Among 
NSAGs, landmines are used for defensive purposes or for slowing 
down the movement of enemy troops. Mines may also be laid follow-
ing a defensive rationale for the protection of the group’s constitu-
ency, family members, or key individuals.4 Landmines also serve an 
offensive strategy when their goal is to kill or maim the opposing 
force, such as to block escape routes during ambushes and counter-
attacks, or in direct targeting of government forces or individuals.4 
When employed under an economic gain strategy, mines do not serve 
any direct military purpose but economic interests. Landmines are 
often laid to protect an important source of revenue such as coca crops 
in Latin America or diamond and gold mines in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, in some cases, NSAGs may use landmines to directly extract 
revenues from the population, such as charging road tolls.4 Other 
types of mine use that serve no direct military or economic purpose 
are sometimes labelled nuisance mining. This strategy has been used 
to disrupt access to key infrastructure. Landmine use that is aimed 
deliberately at civilians in order to empty territories, deny use of basic 
facilities, displace communities, isolate regions, or simply spread ter-
ror also falls under this category.4
Type of device. Landmines may serve different purposes depend-
ing on their main target. The most common types of landmine are 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, which are respectively designed to 
detonate by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. 
Although not considered landmines, the so-called booby traps are 
explosive devices disguised as otherwise harmless objects. Although 
other types of mines exist, this study is restricted to anti-personnel 
and anti-vehicle mines, and booby traps, which are the focus of the 
main treaties and are arguably more disruptive to civilian life than 
other types of explosive devices. In this regard, it is implied that rebel 
groups demonstrate different levels of restraint, depending on which 
type of device is mostly used. The use of anti-vehicle landmines implies 
a higher level of restraint, while the use of anti-personnel landmines 
and booby traps implies lower levels of restraint.
Trigger mechanisms. Mines and other explosive devices can be 
activated by a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, such as pressure, 




nuisance direct accepted low
economic gain direct accepted low
defensive indirect accepted moderate
offensive indirect avoided high
type of device
booby-trap direct accepted low
anti-personnel mine indirect accepted moderate
anti-vehicle mine indirect avoided high
trigger 
mechanism
victim-activated indirect accepted moderate
command-detonated indirect avoided high
location
civilian targets direct accepted low
populated areas indirect accepted moderate
military targets indirect avoided high
unpopulated areas indirect avoided high
frequency
frequent indirect accepted moderate
sporadic indirect avoided high
markings
unmarked minefields indirect accepted moderate
marked minefields indirect avoided high
direct restraint
terror tactics direct accepted low
no restraint policy indirect accepted moderate
restraint policy indirect avoided high
Table 1. Conceptualization of rebel restraint on landmine use.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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pull, tension release, or pressure release.16 In relation to civilian harm, 
however, what matters most is whether the explosive device is victim-
activated or command-detonated. Regardless of the exact type of trig-
ger mechanism, civilians face significantly more risk if the device is 
victim-activated, that is, if the device is designed to detonate by the vic-
tim only, without any external action. Command-detonated explosive 
devices, conversely, are monitored and set off by an operator at a cho-
sen moment, thus avoiding unnecessary collateral damage.16 This does 
not mean that command-detonated devices present no risk whatsoever 
to civilians, as they can be used to directly target civilians, and, in case 
of failing to detonate, they are left as explosive hazards threatening 
the population.17 Regarding the use of landmines and other explosives 
devices, restraint is thus higher for command-detonated devices and 
lower for victim-activated devices. 
Location. The location of landmines depends mostly on their 
strategic use. However, in comparison with government forces, 
NSAGs often have less capacity to lay large quantities of mines, 
and, instead of large and coherent minefields, NSAGs tend to place 
mines in smaller, more precise locations.18 Rebel groups are also 
more likely to deploy landmines more indiscriminately and near 
civilian-dense areas.19 It follows that whether landmines are laid in 
areas with higher or lower risk to civilians can thus indicate differ-
ent levels of restraint by rebel groups.
Frequency. The frequency in the use of landmines varies signifi-
cantly among NSAGs. While some employ mines as their weapon of 
choice, others use them only sporadically, given a specific “need” or 
context in the conflict.4 Again, frequency may also be subject not to 
a specific strategy or policy, but to contextual factors, such as group 
capacity, access to landmines, conflict dynamics, among others. 
Nonetheless, restraint on landmine use can also be demonstrated by 
the frequency that rebel groups lay mines or other explosive devices. 
It follows that, without considering other contextual factors, the lower 
the frequency of use, the higher the level of restraint.
Information-sharing. When compared to professional militaries, 
NSAGs are less likely to follow international marking standards20 for 
their minefields.9 For civilians, this means increased risk of inadver-
tently walking through minefields and increased costs in future mine 
clearance. Likewise, rebel minefields usually do not follow conven-
tional patterns.18,19 In 2006, at least thirty NSAGs had engaged in some 
kind of information-sharing or mine risk education to affected com-
munities.9 Therefore, restraint on landmine use is reflected by whether 
minefields and mined areas are marked, and on how information 
about them is recorded and shared.
Direct restraint. In addition to restraint in relation to the use of 
landmines, direct forms of restraint can also be found on the non-use 
of landmines. Direct restraint can be exercised by rebel groups in codes 
of conduct, internal policies, trainings, and doctrines, as well as in uni-
lateral declarations and ceasefire or peace agreements. For example, 
the Colombian National Liberation Army’s code of conduct explicitly 
mentions the duty to inform civilians of the location of mined areas.21,22 
Conversely, some rebel groups might not formally restrict their use of 
landmines but do so in practice. Other groups, however, might use 
landmines and other explosive devices in a virtually unrestrained way.
Taking into account how landmine use relates to violence against 
civilians, and, thus, restraint, Table 1 summarizes the conceptualiza-
tion of rebel restraint on landmine use.
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN RESTRAINT ON 
LANDMINE USE 
Current theories on restraint range from rationalist to sociological 
approaches. In one instance, restraint may be the product of a rational 
examination of different economic, political, and military interests. 
Armed groups consider factors such as reputation with their constitu-
ency and other stakeholders (e.g., international community), as well 
as the military advantage of having certain weapons or employing 
tactics.23 Alternatively, restraint may be influenced by organizational 
factors, such as military culture, and both formal and informal social-
ization mechanisms.24 Recent research found that NSAGs’ behavior 
towards violence or restraint is the product of their sources of author-
ity, beliefs, traditions, and the group members themselves.11 Finally, 
contextual factors could lead to a lesser exercise of violence but not 
necessarily mean genuine restraint. Because this study is ultimately 
intended to understand the reasons of restraint, it is important to point 
to what restraint is not.
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Not all NSAGs are able to employ landmines, and reduction in land-
mine use does not mean genuine restraint was employed. A common 
example is the seasonal use of landmines, which are only seldom laid 
during winter due to frozen soil and heavy snowfall.25 The systematic 
use of landmines requires significant logistic capability and group 
cohesion; therefore, an NSAG with decreased group capacity could 
display reduced use of landmines.11 Likewise, decreased access to land-
mines and other explosive components, as well as technical expertise 
in production of handmade mines or IEDs, will limit landmine use. 
Finally, landmine use may be reduced due to evolving conflict dynam-
ics, as NSAGs experiencing major victories are more likely to reduce 
landmine use.4 Unrestrained behavior may also be subject to other 
dynamics, even if the rebel leadership is committed to limit the use 
of violence. Reasons for unrestrained behavior and noncompliance 
include conflicting military training and doctrine,26  absence of political 











Figure 1. Contextual factors influencing reduction in landmine use.
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STRATEGIC INCENTIVES
Although seemingly counterintuitive, landmine use may inflict sig-
nificant military and economic costs on rebels. First, rebels are con-
stantly victimized by their own mines, either during the production of 
improvised devices, when laying landmines, or unwillingly activating 
them after they have been laid. NSAGs largely underreport their own 
casualties due to the rebels’ interests in portraying the image of a pro-
fessional and cohesive group. However, the National Democratic Front 
in Myanmar stated that up to 80 percent of its handmade mine manu-
facturers died when assembling improvised landmines.32 Likewise, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s Army (SPLM/A) is believed to 
have suffered significant casualties from their own mines.33 In these 
cases, exercising restraint on landmine use is a matter of safety and 
morale for the rebel group’s own ranks, continuity of operations, and 
the group’s very survival.
Second, particularly in the cases where NSAGs hold control of 
territory, using landmines in the land rebels are fighting for entails 
an inherent contradiction, as mine contamination and future mine 
clearance might be excessively costly.34 Furthermore, NSAGs may be 
economically dependent on the revenues of the land, in which case 
denying access to it with landmines would decrease their revenues. 
Thus, it is expected that rebels would avoid contaminating productive 
land in their own territory.
A second category of strategic incentives of restraint are political 
and reputational costs. Landmine use can influence how NSAGs are 
perceived by their constituency and other domestic and international 
audiences. Civilian support has long been considered a central deter-
minant of civil war outcomes,35 as civilians provide recruits, food, 
information, and safe hiding places. It follows that dependence on 
civilian support creates restraint on the level of one-sided violence,36 
as well as incentives to protect the armed group’s constituency.37 
Under a similar logic, de la Calle38 argues that civilian victimization 
is driven by rebel strength, in the sense that weaker rebels would seek 
civilian support.
Furthermore, local communities are particularly vulnerable to 
landmines and other explosive devices. An NSAG in Myanmar, for 
instance, has allegedly changed their mine use policy after realizing 
that up to 30 percent of mine victims came from the rebels’ own eth-
nic group.32 As a direct consequence of victimization by landmines, 
local communities could decrease support to the armed group.34 It is 
possible that the affected communities would demand the NSAGs to 
restrict their use of landmines and demine certain areas, as observed 
in Colombia39 and Senegal.40
Civilian victimization also entails significant reputational costs 
to other domestic and international audiences, particularly towards 
human rights-conscious audiences.6 Abiding to a shared legal frame-
work—such as international law—plays in favor of rebel groups’ per-
ceived political legitimacy. Exercising restraint on landmine use, 
therefore, entails compliance to international (and sometimes domes-
tic) law6,19,41 and could increase the likelihood of external support, 
political participation, and leverage in negotiations. As an example, 
Herr found that SPLM/A adhered to the landmine ban due to transna-
tional pressure and fear of legitimacy loss.42
Likewise, compliance with IHL may ensure practical and legal secu-
rities to rebels, in particular to the leadership, such as granting the 
legal status of combatants and reciprocity in treatment by government 
forces.6 Accordingly, a recent study led by Gleditsch shows that deci-
sions to commit to a landmine ban, by both governments and NSAGs, 
are mutually dependent.13 Likewise, Fazal and Kovaev have demon-
strated that militarily strong groups seeking international recogni-
tion are more likely to commit to a landmine ban.14,43 Their argument 
focuses on reputation costs and benefits of compliance to international 
norms in comparison to the military utility of landmines and other 
methods of war.
Similarly, rebel leaders may fear criminal indictment for ordering 
the use of anti-personnel landmines. A report has found that rebel 
groups are more likely to exert restraint on landmine use in countries 
where the use of landmines and other similar victim-activated explo-
sive devices has been criminalized by domestic law.4 The effectiveness 
of criminal justice in fostering compliance, however, is still debated.44
It is worth noting that the aforementioned strategic incentives 
are interconnected. Political and reputational costs may have direct 
impact on material support from both the rebel group’s constituency 
and domestic and international audiences, thus compounding to mili-
tary and economic costs. Similarly, decreased military efficiency could 
lead to decreased political support. 
MORAL INCENTIVES
Restraint may also derive from genuine commitment to humanitar-
ian principles, whether they are based on humanitarian norms or the 
group’s own values, beliefs, and traditions. 
Indiscriminate violence is condemned in virtually all cultures, 
so it is expected that armed groups should avoid unnecessary civil-
ian casualties, unless otherwise justified. Moral obligation has been 
found to influence decision-making even over material costs and stra-
tegic interests.45
Sanín and Wood explore the ideology of shaping rebel violence 
and restraint,46 and find that specific ideological and religious moti-
vations can further influence increased restraint and compliance to 
humanitarian norms.47 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (com-
monly referred to as the Taliban), for instance, officially considered 
the use of landmines “an un-Islamic and anti-human act,” which 
“would be punished in accordance with Islamic Law.”48 Similarly, the 
Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Buncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) 
and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines issued a joint 
statement renouncing the use of landmines on ideological grounds.49 
Restraint may also be driven by interaction with potential victims. 
In Colombia, rebel groups oftentimes voluntarily marked mine areas 
or engaged in mine clearance to preserve the communities where they 
operated. Arguably, genuine interest in protecting civilians from the 
effects of landmines comes from ethnic and family ties, as well as con-
tinued interaction with the communities.39 
Knowledge and acceptance of IHL may also genuinely lead to 
restraint on landmine use. Practitioners have found that sustained 
engagement with NSAGs, in particular through education and 
awareness of humanitarian norms, constitutes an important step 
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towards restraint on landmine use.50 State and non-state armed 
actors alike often lack long-term perspective on the humanitarian 
consequences of their own actions, hence the change in behavior 
after engaging with human rights and humanitarian norms advo-
cates.51 In Myanmar, for instance, the Karen National Union, a rebel 
group and landmine user, agreed to cooperate with mine action 
organizations after a series of meetings conveying the relevance of 
international humanitarian law.50
FUTURE RESEARCH
In recent years, rebels have been the most prolific users of land-
mines; however, little has been studied on what drives NSAGs to exer-
cise restraint on landmine use. This study has sought to identify and 
map possible explanations for this variation. Future research should 
measure this variable in different conflict contexts and focus on in-
depth case studies and process tracing analyses in order to identify the 
mechanisms at play in each case. Likewise, future propositions should 
account for interaction effects between the different influencing factors 
of restraint on landmine use.
Although this article offers no conclusive answer on how to engage 
rebels in the landmine ban, it has highlighted possible influencing 
factors leading to restraint. Relevant to policymakers and prac- 
titioners, it offers potential entry points and avenues for future dia-
logue. It remains the task of researchers, policymakers, and practitio-
ners alike to enhance the understanding of rebel motivations to stop 
using landmines, and, most importantly, act upon them.  
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Figure 2. Influencing factors for restraint on landmine use.
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